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Abstract—The wide adoption of wearable smart devices with
onboard cameras greatly increases people’s concern on privacy
infringement. Here we explore the possibility of easing persons
from photos captured by smart devices according to their privacy
protection requirements. To make this work, we need to address
two challenges: 1) how to let users explicitly express their
privacy protection intention, and 2) how to associate the privacy
requirements with persons in captured photos accurately and
efficiently. Furthermore, the association process itself should not
cause portrait information leakage and should be accomplished
in a privacy-preserving way. In this work, we design, develop,
and evaluate a protocol, called InvisibleMe, that enables a user
to flexibly express her privacy requirement and empowers the
photo service provider (or image taker) to exert the privacy
protection policy. Leveraging the visual distinguishability of
people in the field-of-view and the dimension-order-independent
property of vector similarity measurement, InvisibleMe achieves
high accuracy and low overhead. We implement a prototype
system, and our evaluation results on both the trace-driven and
real-life experiments confirm the feasibility and efficiency of our
system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, smart devices with onboard cameras e.g., smart
phones and glasses, are pervasive in our daily lives. These
smart devices can capture and even share photos without in-
forming the parties in the picture, thus raises many concerns on
people’s privacy infringement. Particularly, the wilder adoption
of smart glasses, e.g. Google Glass, leads to severe concerns
for misuse because Glass can capture photos/videos far less
conspicuously than a traditional hand-held device. Secretive
photographing without clear warning beforehand and posses-
sion of secretively taken photos are both privacy violations.
Even worse, if the photos which contain information beyond
what users want to reveal are shared in Internet, it will make
users extremely susceptible to various attacks.
To protect people’s portrait privacy from unwilling photo-
taking and publication, many photo service providers or users
have taken actions in different ways. For example, some Glass
wearers whip their device off in inappropriate situations, such
as in gym locker rooms or work meetings; some business
bans smart glasses inside their buildings to respect customers’
privacy [1]; and the Glass manufacturer (e.g., Google) does
not allow developers to create applications that take photo
silently. Lawmakers are also beginning to consider various
privacy issues of Glass, including whether it should be capable
of facial recognition [2]. Although face recognition is a useful
function, especially for social applications, face is a critical
private identifiable information. At present, there are no facial
recognition technologies built into Glass and the manufacturer
has no plans to use it unless they have strong privacy protec-
tions in place. These methods, however, are broad-brush and
blunt which can significantly hurt the applications of smart
devices. Therefore, it is appealing to consider how one might
build a system in which users do not leak portrait privacy while
guaranteeing a comfortable usage of smart glasses/cameras.
Instead of discarding the smart glasses/cameras due to
privacy concerns, in this work, we seek a solution for reaching
an ultimate goal of privacy-friendly Glass/camera, operating
transparently to end users. Our solution will let end users
to express their privacy requirements and glasses/cameras
or photo service providers will exert the privacy protection
mechanisms. When taking a photo/video, the smart device will
detect who (in the picture/video) requested privacy protection,
and then remove them from the image automatically. Our
protocol can also be used for automatically tagging people
in a photo when a user expresses an interest to be tagged with
his/her information.
To implement such a privacy-friendly camera, we need to
address several critical challenges. First, we should enable
privacy-advocator efficiently and flexibly to express his/her
privacy requirements/intentions. Several methods could be
used for this task, such as using visible specialized tag (e.g.,
QR code), or encoding the request and transmitting it using
wireless devices. For users’ convenience and aesthetics, in this
work, we adopt the latter approach by encoding his/her portrait
in the request. Then, the second challenge is that we should
accurately and efficiently associate each privacy-seeking user
with an image region in the photo taken by another user
(the photographer ). Furthermore, the association process itself
should not cause portrait information leakage and should be
accomplished in a privacy-preserving way. Face recognition
[3], [4] is widely used to identify people in photos, but in
practice it suffers when there lacks a clear front view of faces.
Sophisticated but complicated matching schemes may cause
high overhead and long delay. The matching problem itself
is difficult due to the accuracy and efficiency requirements,
let alone completing matching process in a private and non-
interactive manner with untrusted server. Matching a user’s
privacy-expression with a possible people in a photo can be
reduced to some sort of vector matching. Many private vector
matching protocols use multi-party computation techniques,
which require frequent interactions among participants. Most
exiting private vector matching methods (in both multi-party
computation and outsourced manner) use homomorphic en-
cryption [5], [6] or garble circuit [6], and cause high compu-
tation cost for both client and cloud. The third challenge is
that the privacy-friendly Glass/camera should be transparent to
all users and cause minimal extra overhead to mobile devices.
An ad hoc approach may lead to requirements for ”always-
on” neighbour discovery, frequent information exchanging as
well as complex image matching computation on user devices.
To reduce the overhead of users, our protocol will outsource
most of these tasks to cloud with a well-designed strategy to
prevent privacy leakage to untrusted cloud and other users.
The main contributions of this work are as follows:
•To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present
a portrait privacy preserving photo capturing and sharing
approach. With our approach in Section III, people who require
not to be captured in photo will be automatically erased from
the photo and verification of the removal is also supported.
•We comprehensively analyze the privacy issues during the
photo capturing and sharing and define three types of threats
in Section II. Based on the proposed model, we present a
solution protecting all three types of privacy information.
•For accurate and efficient matching between people’s pri-
vacy intentions and people in the photo, we introduce a graph-
based portrait profile and design a robust matching algorithm
to recognize and erase privacy-seeking people in Section IV.
•We propose a highly efficient privacy-preserving vector
distance protocol in a non-interactive manner with untrusted
server in Section V, which significantly reduces the com-
putation complexity and communication cost than existing
homomorphic encryption and garble circuit based solutions.
With our protocol, most computation tasks are transferred from
smart devices to the cloud in a privacy-preserving way.
•We design and implement a prototype system and verify
the effectiveness of our scheme by extensive experiments as
well as case studies in Section VI.
II. PRIVACY REQUIREMENT
A. Motivation
To protect users’ portrait privacy, one straight-forward ap-
proach that has already been adopted by business and man-
ufacturer is to simply suppress the usage of smart cameras
in specific place and time, e.g., turn off the photographing
functionality in a meeting room or forbid silent photo taking.
These methods, however, are broad-brush and blunt which can
significantly hurt the applications of smart devices. Besides,
they do not meet the user varying privacy intentions. In fact,
not all persons are unwilling to be photographed and also peo-
ple will feel quite uncomfortable if they are frequently forced
to turn off their Glass. Thus, in this work we seek solution to
give privacy control back to persons being photographed in a
smarter way.
As an example shown in Fig. 1, when someone uses his
smart Glass to take a photo, people in the field of view
(FOV) should be notified (or the photographer should know the
privacy protection intentions of people in FOV). Then persons
who are unwilling to be photographed, e.g. Neighbor 1, should
Photographer 
Neighbor 2
Field Of View
Invisible
Tagged
Neighbor 1
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Lily
Photo
Fig. 1: Example application scenario of InvisibleMe: the in-
visible person is erased from the photo and the tagged person
is labeled in the photo.
have a convenient way to specify their privacy intentions,
and thus be automatically erased from the photo. We refer to
them as invisible users. Users that would like to make friends
with the photographer, e.g., Neighbor 2, can be automatically
tagged on the photo and share information. We refer to them
as tagged users. The photographer just takes other people into
the photo as usual. The system can motivate the photographer
by mutual registry: only those who protect other invisible
users can be registered to be protected by others. Supporting
tagging people automatically, which could be helpful and fun
in many scenarios (e.g., facebook), also gives incentives to
the photographer. Besides, after one time setting the solution
should be transparent to all users and avoid incurring high
overhead to their smart devices. Finally, the portrait privacy
protection strategy should be well designed and avoid further
leakage of any type of private information.
B. Threats to Portrait Privacy
Photos contain rich information, including people’s appear-
ance, location, activities, etc.. Facing massive cameras and
image analysis techniques [4], [7] , people’s portrait privacy
is badly in need of protection. In this work, we focus on
protecting users’ portrait information. Here, a portrait not only
includes the user’s face but also his/her body, since clothes
and accessories could also reveal identification information.
We consider three types of threats to portrait privacy.
Visual portrait privacy. The most intuitive way to violate a
user’s portrait privacy is to capture and publish (e.g., through
photo sharing systems) a photo containing his/her visible
portrait. Simply blurring all faces in images, e.g., [8] and
Google Street View, will disable the normal photographing
function.
In our protocol InvisibleMe we propose to match the people
in the photo to their privacy protection intentions, and erase
only people that should be invisible. As we will discuss in
detail in Section III, a user express his/her privacy requirement
by encoding his/her portrait, which clearly cannot be transmit-
ted in its original form (otherwise his/her portrait privacy is
broken by himself/herself). So, we need to provide privacy
protections in all these operations.
Portrait feature privacy. This type of threats occur inside
some image services, e.g. image matching or face recognition.
These services don’t use visible images of directly, but take
3UR[LPLW\
6HUYLFH
0DWFKLQJ
6HUYLFH
9HULILFDWLRQ
6HUYLFH
6HOI3RUWUDLW3URILOH
*HQHUDWLRQ
)293RUWUDLW3URILOHV
*HQHUDWLRQ
3ULYDF\
&RQFHDOLQJStart
Cloud
Neighbors Photographer
Fig. 2: Baseline system architecture.
feature vectors of image as the descriptor, e.g., Eigenfaces
[4] and color histogram. But users can also be identified by
features of portrait image. For example, face images can be
reconstructed from face vectors [9]. During the process, the
leakage of portrait features also violates users’ privacy.
Inference privacy. Even if an image system hides original
images and other information such as their feature vectors, an
adversary with a collection of images (an image dictionary)
can infer the hidden content using the similarity measurement
function of the system. Hence, we should prevent adversaries
from obtaining the similarity measuring results to enhance the
privacy protection.
InvisibleMe leverages existing solutions to protect other
user privacy, e.g., location privacy [10], since it is not the
focus of this study.
Adversary model. Our approach defends a user’s portrait
privacy against both untrusted cloud server and malicious
users. For the cloud, we apply the widely used ”honest-but-
curious” assumption. The cloud server will follow the protocol,
but might conduct extra work to harvest portrait images of
invisible people, reconstruct invisible portraits using feature
vectors or infer the invisible content using image dictionary.
Also, we assume the cloud won’t collude with any client to
conduct an attack. A malicious user could participate to harvest
other users’ portrait information by eavesdropping their com-
munication with the cloud. All users except the photographer
should be prevented from obtaining the portrait information of
invisible users. Although the photographer already owns the
photo of invisible people, he/she may misbehave to preserve
the invisible people who should be erased and publish the
photo through Internet. So, we also need a verification scheme
against dishonest photographers.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN OVERVIEW
Facing critical challenges introduced in Section I, we design
our system to achieve both the privacy and system efficiency
goals. With our graph-based portrait matching algorithm, the
baseline approach is effective to protect users’ visual portrait
privacy by accurately locating invisible people in photos and
erases them automatically. But there is a risk of exposing
portrait features to untrusted cloud and other participants.
Furthermore, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving out-
sourced vector distance protocol, based on which an advanced
approach provides portrait feature privacy and inference pri-
vacy protection with little extra overhead for the client. In this
section, we will sketch our system architecture.
People
Detect
Segment
Foreground
Extract
Graph
Generate
Fig. 3: Portrait graph representation.
A. Overview of Baseline System
In our system, there are three parties involved: the photogra-
pher, who takes the photo; the neighbors, who could be in the
FOV of the photographer (as presented in Fig. 1); the cloud,
who takes charge of location, communication and computation
services. The architecture and workflow of our baseline system
are illustrated in Fig. 2
We would like to take a typical photographing process as
an example to describe the functionality of each component
and the system workflow. Users create their personal portrait
profiles using the Self Portrait Profile Generation component
and encode their portrait profiles to express their privacy
requirements. In our design, a set of vision feature vectors are
extracted from subregions of a portrait image. Both face and
body features are extracted, in case that there may lack a clear
front view of face. We introduce a graph structure to encode
the extracted vision features (feature vectors are properties of
nodes) and use the graph as the portrait profile, as the examples
in Fig. 3. Compared with uploading the original image, the
feature graph shows a low risk on privacy leakage without
lose of matching functionality, and are much more efficient
for both computation and communication. Besides, the graph
representation is highly robust for pose changes of people and
cameras. For each invisible user, his/her self portrait profile is
generated once and for all until he/she updates it. While the
face features of a user remains the same, the user could change
his/her outfits. The portrait profile could be automatically
updated when the user selfies or while he/she uses the phone
with the frontal camera facing himself/herself. In our advanced
approach, transformed version of portrait graph are used to
improve privacy protection. With portrait graphs, we convert
the people matching problem to graph matching problem.
Triggered by a photo shooting action, the Proximity Service
on cloud will be automatically notified and start to check if
there are invisible people in the FOV of the photographer.
If any, the cloud will inform them and start the next step.
Proximity service can be realized easily using common loca-
tion service and onboard compass. By restricting the number
of potential matched invisible users, our system can achieve
high matching accuracy and low overhead.
In the next step, after being informed by cloud, invisible
neighbors upload their self portrait profiles to cloud (this could
be done in advance to reduce the delay). Meanwhile, the
photographer detects all people in the photo and extracts their
Original
Invisible 
Peope
Privacy
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Image
Inpaiting 
Image
Blur
Fig. 4: Example of automatic privacy concealing (erase invis-
ible people from photos) by image inpainting [12] or blur.
portrait profiles with the FOV Portrait Profiles Generation
component, which works similarly to self portrait profile
generation. These profiles will be uploaded to cloud as well.
Then the Matching Service will match portrait profiles of
invisible users to portrait profiles from the photo and determine
people that should be erased from the photo. The graph
matching algorithm will be discussed in detail in Section IV.
The matched results will be sent to photographer, and then the
Privacy Concealing component will erase the corresponding
image regions of invisible people from the photo automatically
by blurring or other more sophisticated techniques, like image
inpainting [11], [12], to maximize the aesthetics. We show an
example of removing invisible people from photo in Fig. 4.
For the inpainting, we use the code from Criminisi’s work
[12]. After the removal, the photographer can store or share the
photo using the cloud service. Note that, based on the personal
specification, the whole procedure works the same way for
tagged users and the ”erase” operation can be alternated to
”tag” to augment many social applications.
In case there are dishonest photographers who don’t com-
plete the removal, InvisibleMe supports verification of re-
moval. All invisible users’ portrait profiles have been uploaded
to the cloud in the previous stage. Once the photo is shared
through Internet, the Verification Service will check the photo
as follows the cloud first conducts a people detection on the
photo and extracts all portrait profiles; then the cloud matches
these profiles with the cached profiles of invisible neighbors,
if there is a matching, it can tell that the photographer didn’t
follow the protocol. The verification process can be completed
alone by the cloud without any interaction with users.
B. Overview of Advanced System
The baseline protocol protects the visual privacy of peo-
ple’s portraits, but exposes users’ portrait profile (i.e. feature
vectors) to the cloud and even the eavesdroppers. With some
feature vectors an adversary could have a chance to match
them with existing photos or even reconstruct the photo. In
the advance approach, we retains the visual portrait privacy
protection and improve the system to protect users’ portrait
feature privacy and inference privacy (defined in Section II-B).
The graph based profile matching scheme should be conducted
in a privacy-preserving manner. The core of the portrait profile
matching algorithm is to measure the distance between vision
feature vectors. We cannot directly adopt existing privacy-
preserving vector distance protocols based on homomorphic
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Fig. 5: Advanced system architecture.
encryption [5], [6] and gabled circuit [6] due to their large
computation and communication cost. In InvisibleMe we pro-
pose a highly efficient outsourced vector distance protocol (see
Section V). As shown in the red blocks in Fig. 5, combining a
well designed scrambling scheme and locality sensitive hash,
all invisible neighbors can secretly transform their vectors in
a distance preserving way. Then the cloud can measure vector
distances using the transformed vectors and match transformed
portrait graph with the same algorithm as in the baseline
system. Our scheme protects invisible users’ portrait profiles
(from both himself/herself and the photographer) with very
little extra cost on the client side for generating transformed
portrait graph. But, it saves computation cost for the cloud,
because the distance computation of high-dimensional real
number vectors is converted to distance of low-dimensional
binary hash code.
The architecture of the advance system is presented in
Figure 5, except vector transformation and verification, other
components are the same as that in the baseline system.
Here, the verification is more challenging, because the cloud
only knows the transformed portrait graphs of invisible users.
Without knowing the secret transformation, the cloud cannot
compare them with portrait graphs directly extracted from
the uploaded photo. When an invisible user needs to check
if his/her portrait has been removed, he/she need to start a
verification and participate in the process as follows: the cloud
sends all extracted feature vectors in a random order to the
invisible user. Note that, these feature vectors are supposed
to belong to preserved visible people if the photographer is
honest. And the invisible user transforms them in the same way
as his/her self feature vectors and sends the results transformed
vectors to the cloud. Then the cloud can compare preserved
people in the photo and invisible neighbors using transformed
portrait graphs, and detect the dishonest photographer.
IV. PORTRAIT PROFILE GENERATION AND MATCHING
A. Portrait Profile Generation
After applying a people detection on a photo [7], [13],
we obtain portrait images (including both people faces and
bodies) from this photo as shown in the first subfigure of
Fig. 3. Then portrait image can be segmented into adjacent
regions by different colors and textures [14]. Given one portrait
image, a graph G = (V,E) can be constructed, where V
is a set of nodes representing segmented regions and E are
edges connecting any two regions that share a boundary. Then
we measure each node’s confidence of being a part of the
person and remove the node with low confidence to eliminate
the background. The confidence calculation is omitted due
to space limitation. Fig. 3 shows examples of foreground
extraction and portrait graph generation, which provide more
accurate graph representation of people portrait. The result of
foreground extraction can also be employed by the privacy
concealing component as the accurate erase area to achieve
better looking removal, as shown in Fig. 4. For each region
of portrait, vision feature vectors, e.g., face feature vector,
color histogram and texture vector, are extracted as property of
the corresponding node. We will give more detail about node
properties in the implementation section (Section. VI).
B. Portrait Graph Matching Scheme
To achieve accurate and efficient portrait graph matching,
there are several challenging issues should be addressed with
low computation cost: graphs structure of the same person
varies due to changing illumination condition and viewpoint;
incomplete graphs could be produced due to occlusion; portrait
profile could still contain some noisy nodes from background.
As a result, the matching algorithm should be elastic to
node/edge division, aggregation, insertion and deletion, and
robust to noise nodes. Existing graph matching methods usu-
ally have application-oriented specifications [15]–[17], e.g.,
assumptions about node numbers, graph structure and pre-
knowledge of correspondences, make them difficult to be
directly applied in this work. To meet the critical requirements
of portrait profile matching, we design a voting based strategy
in which both the node similarity and graph structure are
considered.
Let graph Gx = (V x, Ex) denote portrait profile X (say
produced by a user) and Gy = (V y, Ey) denote portrait
profile Y (say produced by a photographer). Here V x =
{vx
1
, vx
2
, ..., vxp} and V y = {v
y
1
, v
y
2
, ..., vyq }. Each node own
some feature vectors as its property. In order to improve
matching accuracy as well as speed up the computation
process, we add a label for each node, which describes its
type, for example, human face or human body. Only nodes
of the same type can be matched. The distance between two
nodes of different types is regarded as infinite. As human
face is a strong feature to identify a person, our matching
scheme will firstly consider the matching between nodes
labeled with ”human face” (e.g., Node No.5 in Fig. 3), then
invoke an integrated graph matching. In this way, our method
provides more accurate and robust matching than existing face
recognition based methods.
Initialization. Let the similarity between nodes vxi and v
y
j
be S(vxi , v
y
i ), which can be obtained through measuring the
distances between feature vectors of two graph nodes. Note
that, if vxi and v
y
i have different type labels, S(vxi , v
y
i ) is set
to zero. In Section V, we will discuss the details of privacy
preserving vector distance computation. During the matching
process, a matrix M with p rows and q columns is built. Each
entry Mij = {fij, nij , cij} of the matrix is a triple where
fij is a boolean flag indicating whether node vyj is a possible
match for node vxi , nij caches the one-hop neighbor match
information and cij is a counter. Details of these parameters
will be presented in the following parts. A match is represented
as an assignment for all {fij}, where there is at most one fij
equaling TRUE for every column j. All {fij} are initiated
to TRUE.
After the initialization, our graph matching scheme consists
of three stages.
Stage 1. We eliminate wrong matches based on the similarities
of node pairs. If S(vxi , v
y
i ) is above a pre-specified threshold
ξs, the corresponding flag fij is set to TRUE, otherwise, we
eliminate this match by set fij to FALSE. Note that, a node
in V x does not necessarily have a possible match in V y , thus
there can be rows with all FALSE flags. After this stage,
all node pairs with TRUE flags are considered as candidate
matches.
Stage 2. We explore the one-hop neighbor matching for
each candidate match. For each candidate match (vxi , v
y
j ), the
neighbor sets of them are denoted as NE(vxi ) and NE(v
y
j ).
We find the most likely mapping from NE(vxi ) to NE(v
y
j ).
To achieve this, we firstly look for potential matches in matrix
M for each node in NE(vxi ). We then connect each node in
NE(vxi ) with its matched nodes in NE(v
y
j ) with undirected
edges. Nodes in both sets as well as the edges form a bipartite
graph and the problem can be transformed to find a maximum
match on the bipartite graph. To address this problem, we
apply the Hungary algorithm [18] which outputs a mapping
from NE(vxi ) to NE(v
y
j ). As mentioned above, the mapping
is denoted as nij .
nij(v
x
a) =
{
v
y
b if vxa matches v
y
b
Φ if there is no match in NE(vyj ) for vxa
where vxa ∈ NE(vxi ) and v
y
b ∈ NE(v
y
j ).
Stage 3. We choose at most one assignment for each node
in V x by a voting based scheme. For each candidate match
(vxi , v
y
j ), we build two trees rooted at vxi and v
y
j on graph Gx
and Gy respectively. The two trees are traced in parallel on
two graphs with the BFS method. Here we restrict the tree
growth to the constraint that, once a node vxk on Gx and its
matched node vyg are appended to the trees, the neighbors of
vxk which have not been included can be added to the tree
only if they have matched nodes in NE(vyg ) according the
recorded mapping nkg . When two trees have grown to the
maximum size, we get a possible match for the subgraphs. In
this approach, we propose a voting scheme to determine the
best match. That is, for each candidate match (vxk , vyg ) on the
two trees, we increase the counter value of ckg in entry Mkg .
After trees of all candidate matches (vxi , v
y
j ) voted, we check
the cij in each entry Mij and retain the largest one for each
column. Then matrix M indicates a most likely match of Gx
and Gy and the similarity between the two portrait profiles
are calculated by integrating similarities of all matched nodes
and edges.
S(Gx, Gy) =
∑
fij=TRUE S(v
x
i , v
y
j )
‖ V x ‖ + ‖ V y ‖
+
∑
eab∈E
x
∑
ecd∈E
y δ(eab, ecd)
‖ Ex ‖ + ‖ Ey ‖
where
δ(eab, ecd) =
{
1 if fac = TRUE & fbd = TRUE
0 otherwise
V. IMPROVEMENT OF PRESERVING PORTRAIT PRIVACY
The main idea of our outsourced privacy-preserving vec-
tor distance protocol is to transform the original vectors
to random vectors, meanwhile, preserve the distance among
vectors. Moreover, the transformation should be kept secret
from adversaries. In this way, the distance can be measured
on transformed vectors as on original vectors (which means
light-weight computation), but the adversary cannot obtain
the original vectors nor compute the distance between the
transformed vectors and vectors from a dictionary to infer
the original ones. Let the distance function of two vectors
x = (x1,x2, · · · ),y = (y1,y2, · · · ) ∈ V be d(x,y). As
shown in Fig. 5, we design the transformation with two main
building blocks: Profile Scrambling and Locality Sensitive
Hash (LSH). The profile scrambling module works based
on the observation that vector distances are dimension-order-
independent, that is when we randomly change the dimension
order of both x and y consistently to obtain scrambled x′ and
y′, we have d(x,y) ≡ d(x′,y′). Once the scrambling order is
kept secret, the original vectors are protected and a dictionary
based inference is prevented. In case there may be some
dimension-dependent characteristics of vision feature vectors,
e.g., in the color histogram the dimensions representing red
component usually have large values, we employ the LSH
module to transform the scrambled feature vectors into an-
other low-dimensional vector space. LSH hides the scrambled
feature vectors from all parties and makes the statistic analysis
on scrambled vectors infeasible, meanwhile it also preserves
the distance among vectors. Besides, lower-dimension vectors
reduce the cost for vector distance computation and vector
transmission. On the other hand, changing the dimension order
of x randomly to x′ makes their hashes totally different,
because there is a random distance between them. Hence, the
vector scrambling works like a random salt to strength the
security property of LSH as well, that makes the dictionary
attack against LSH infeasible. Combining vector scrambling
and LSH, we protect feature vectors of invisible users from
untrusted cloud and other parties, and outsource most compu-
tation to the cloud in a secure and noninteractive manner.
In the following subsections, we will introduce the LSH
based vector distance measurement as a preliminary, then
present our privacy-preserving vector distance protocol.
A. LSH based Vector Distance Measurement
The key insight behind LSH is that it is possible to construct
hash functions such that close vectors will have the same hash
value with higher probability than vectors that are far apart.
Different LSH functions are designed for various distance
metrics, e.g., Euclidean distance, Hamming distance, cosine
distance. In our system, we use the commonly used Euclidean
distance dE(x,y) =
√∑
i(xi − yi)
2
. Particularly, for high-
dimensional vector space V = RD with Euclidean distance,
an LSH function is defined as follows [19]:
H(x) =< h1(x), h2(x), · · · , hm(x) > (1)
hi(x) =
{
1 if a·x
W
≥ 1, i = 1, 2, · · · ,m
0 otherwise (2)
where a ∈ RD is a random vector with each dimension
chosen independently from the standard Gaussian distribution
N(0, 1). Here each hi is an atomic LSH function, and the
LSH function H generates a hash vector of the input vector
by concatenating m scalar atomic hash values. The window
size W and m control the distance range that the mapping is
sensitive to. In the advance system, the cloud determines the
hashing function H and publishes it to all participants.
According to the definition of LSH, the differences between
hash vectors indicate the distance between original vectors. In
this work we apply the Hamming distance between hash vec-
tors to approximate the distance between original vectors. Our
experimental results show that the Hamming distance between
hash vectors is nearly monotonic to distance measurement
between original vectors.
B. Outsourced Privacy-preserving Distance Computing
Here, we assume that each user share a secure communi-
cation channel with the cloud. Then the transformed vectors
are protected from other participants. In a specific round
of photographing, to preserve distance between transformed
vectors, the challenge is that all participants (photographer
and invisible neighbors) must scramble their feature vectors
in a consistent order individually and secretly. We refer to the
scramble order as scramble code SC. To achieve the same SC,
all participants first need to generate a same random seed R
secretly. The multi-user agreement protocol requires that the
untrusted cloud cannot learn the random seed and the scramble
code, although it controls all communications between users.
Random number exchange. There are many well-designed
group key agreement protocols [20], [21], but most of them
require multiple communication rounds among participants,
which could cause long delay. Utilizing the honest-but-curious
cloud and secure communication channels between the cloud
and users, we adapt the practical distributed group key agree-
ment protocol proposed in [20] to achieve round optimum
and computation efficient random number agreement. Let
U1, · · · , Un be a dynamic subset of all users who want
to generate a common random number and our protocol is
presented in Algorithm 1. With this protocol, the photographer
and his/her invisible neighbors can obtain the same random
number, while the cloud learns nothing about the random
number.
Scramble code generation. After obtaining consistent random
seed R, each participant generates the scramble code using
Algorithm 2, and rearranges the dimension order of each
feature vector according to the scramble code.
As illustrated in Fig. 5, after scrambling feature vectors, the
photographer and invisible neighbors apply LSH to scrambled
vectors to get transformed vectors for current round. The cloud
can simply use the transformed vectors to compute distance
and conduct the same graph matching algorithm as in the basic
scheme. While the membership doesn’t change, the random
number remains the same. In this case, the photographer can
use the same random number to generate transformed vectors
for new photos, and all invisible neighbors do not need any
Algorithm 1 Random Number Agreement.
System Initialization:
Cloud generates and publishes system parameters: 1) a large
prime number p = Θ(2cN), a constant c ≥ 1, q = Θ(2N ) and
g ∈ Zp of order q = Θ(2N ).
Each user Ui generates his private parameter ai ∈ Zq and public
parameter bi = gai mod p and sends bi to the cloud.
Cloud checks that bqi ≡ 1 mod p for all i = 1, · · · , n.
Runtime:
1: Cloud arranges n users’ indices in a cycle and sends bi−1 and
bi+1 to each Ui, i = 1, · · · , n.
2: Each Ui, i = 1, · · · , n computes ci and sends it to cloud
ci = (bi+1/bi−1)
ai mod p. (3)
3: Cloud sends c1, · · · , cn to each Ui, i = 1, · · · , n.
4: Each Ui, i = 1, · · · , n computes the random number
Ri = (bi−1)
nai · cn−1i · c
n−2
i+1 · · · ci−2 mod p. (4)
Although each user generates Ri individually, all Ri equal to
the same random number
R = ga1a2+a2a3+···+ana1 mod p. (5)
Algorithm 2 Scramble code generation.
Input: Vector dimension N ; Random number R; Sorted set S =
{1, 2, · · · , N};
Output: Scrambled dimension sequence SC;
1: for k = N − 1; k >= 0; k −− do
2: i = R/k!;
3: SC[N − k] = S[i];
4: Remove S[i] from S;
5: R = R mod k!;
6: end for
7: return SC;
recalculation. When the membership changes, the cloud can
insert/remove users into/from the exiting ring of Algorithm 1
to update the random number for a new round. Note that, in
this case, most users do not need to recalculate the Step 2 in
Algorithm 1. Based on our evaluation, the runtime for random
generation time is usually only 0.014s, which is negligible
for human movement. Once the random number is updated,
the system achieves randomized transformation outputs for the
same feature vector in different rounds.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
A. Prototype Implementation
We implement prototype systems of both variants. To sup-
port automatic people detection, we implement the most pop-
ular face detection [13] and pedestrian detection [7] algorithm
based on the library of OpenCV. To generate portrait graph,
we adopt JSeg [14] for image segmentation. Leveraging the
library of MPEG-7, a 48-byte eigenfaces vector [4] is extracted
as the property of a node labeled with face, and a 64-byte
color histogram vector and a 20-byte texture vector (edge
histogram with 4 blocks and 5 orientations) are extracted
as the property for other nodes. InvisibleMe is compatible
with any other vector-based feature descriptors. Obtaining the
matching results, invisible people are removed from the photo
by blurring and inpainting [12], as shown in Fig. 4. Except the
image processing, all other building blocks are realized using
Java, including portrait graph matching, LSH, random number
agreement, vector scrambling and the messaging module. The
client side are developed as an app on Android system for
case study. A user starts this app by inputting his/her portrait
profile via selfieing.
B. Case Study and Experiment setup
To test the practicality and efficiency of InvisibleMe the
evaluation is conducted in a crowded real-life scenario: a
networking workshop with more than 50 attendees in a 200m2
meeting hall. 10 volunteers (4 female and 6 male) acted as
invisible users and also photographers. Within one day, the
volunteers took photos freely and our system recorded the
cost and photos. After the experiment, we got 208 photos.
1326 pedestrians are detected which belong to 42 individuals
(7 female and 35 male), but only 412 faces are detected. It
implies that a whole body detection and description (e.g., our
graph model) is necessary. We manually labeled all captured
people as the ground truth for the following evaluations.
Experiment setting. In the experiments, we use three types
of phones as clients: HTC G10 (1024Hz CPU and 768M
RAM), HTC G23 (1536Hz CPU and 1G RAM) and HTC
New One (1741Hz CPU and 2G RAM). One laptop is used
as the cloud: ThinkPad X1 with i7 2.7GHz CPU and 4GB
RAM. Based on our extensive evaluation, to achieve the
tradeoff between matching efficiency and accuracy, we set
the parameter of the matching methods as ξs = 0.5 and the
parameters of LSH as W = 3 and m = 128 (the hashed
vector is 128 bit). For the random number generation, N
is set to 512, which provides sufficient protection for the
random number agreement protocol. The analysis of parameter
setting is omitted due to space limitation. The the following
evaluation, we denote the implementation of the baseline
system as InvisibleMe-Basic and the implementation of the
advance system as InvisibleMe-Advanced .
C. Matching Accuracy
Here we investigate the most important metric, the portrait
matching accuracy of both variants, which determines the
correctness of invisible people removal.
We start by examining the consistency and distinguisha-
bility of user’s portrait graph by self-similarity (similarity
between the same entity’s portrait graphs) and cross-similarity
(similarity between different entities’ portrait graphs). In this
evaluation, we remove the face property since it is highly dis-
tinctive but cannot always be obtained. Figure. 6 presents the
evaluation results using the dataset. The upper blue line stands
for mean self-similarity for each entity, and the lower red
line is mean cross-similarity between this entity and all other
entities. We notice that, generally portrait graph has a good
consistency, i.e., high self-similarity and small variance. And
the obvious gap between self-similarity and cross-similarity
shows a good distinguishability. In fact, in most cases, portrait
graph can provide accurate matching without face features,
which implies better privacy protection.
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Fig. 6: Portrait similarity variances.
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Then, we analyze the matching correctness by analyzing
all possible combinations using the dataset. A false negative
(FN) happens when a user A is invisible, but not removed
from the photo due to a match score lower than a match
threshold θs. A false positive (FP) happens when user A is
invisible, but another visible user C is removed due to a
higher match scores than both the threshold and A’s score.
In InvisibleMe-Basic matching is conducted on portrait graph
with plain feature vectors. Fig. 7 illustrates the percentage
of FN and FP changing with different threshold θs. By
selecting the threshold θs = 0.5, InvisibleMe-Basic achieves
0.5% false negative and 2.1% false positive without using
any face property. With face property, the false negative
decreases to about 0.1% and false positive is less than
1%. In InvisibleMe-Advanced feature vectors are transformed
by scrambling and LSH. While the scrambling retains the
accurate distance between vectors, LSH could cause some
accuracy loss. Will the transformation reduce the matching
accuracy? With appropriate parameters m = 128 and W =
3, InvisibleMe-Advanced achieves comparable accuracy with
InvisibleMe-Basic , as shown in Fig. 8. When θs = 0.5, the
false negative is about 0.7% and the false positive is about
2.9% without any face property. So, both variants support
accurate matching and our vector transformation achieves
good portrait feature privacy protection with little accuracy
loss. Based on the evaluation, in the rest experiments, the
threshold θs is set to 0.5.
D. Micro Benchmark
Communication cost. In InvisibleMe-Basic each face node
takes 48B and each other node takes 84B. The size of the
portrait graph depends on the node number k. For most ap-
plications, k ≤ 10 is sufficient, so the communication cost for
each portrait is 0.82KB. In InvisibleMe-Advanced after encod-
ing, each vector is hashed to 128 bits, which reduces the size of
a portrait to 0.15KB. Protocol InvisibleMe-Advanced requires
extra communication for random number agreement, which
is only about 0.19KB. InvisibleMe costs each participant less
than 1KB data transmission to enable portrait privacy pro-
tection. The cost for a photographer depends on the peo-
ple number in the captured photo, but in most cases (with
less than 10 people in photo), less than 10KB overhead
is incurred, which is much less than a photo. In general,
InvisibleMe achieves much smaller transmitted data size and
better privacy protection than transmitting the image itself.
Computation cost. In InvisibleMe-Basic the computation cost
is composed of portrait graph generation on the client side, and
portrait matching on the cloud. InvisibleMe-Advanced costs
extra computation for random number agreement and vector
transformation by scrambling and LSH. The runtime is only
about 3 ms to transform ten 64-dimension feature vectors.
Table. I presents all the decomposed computing time. It
shows that, the major computation delay is caused by image
processing. For a participant, it only needs to be executed once
for the profile setup; for a photographer, it needs to be executed
for every captured photo. The runtime of portrait detection
and segmentation depend on the resolution and complexity
of the photo, but the detection and segmentation results are
not sensitive to scaling. Hence, in our prototype all images
are scaled to about 240,000 pixels. For the photographer, on
average it takes about 0.4s to conduct face and pedestrian
detection. Given a portrait image/subimage, the processing
time of segmentation and feature extraction is about 2.6s. On
average, there are 28.2 regions of each portrait.
TABLE I: Microbenchmarks of Runtime (in second)
Client
Segmentation 0.5 2.4 8.1
Extraction 0.02 0.25 1.3
Random-Gen 0.012 0.014 0.017
Cloud
Matching (basic) 0.015 0.037 0.079
Matching (advanced) 0.006 0.01 0.039
Random-Init 1.31 0.9 1.57
Compared with the image processing, the runtime of graph
generation and matching is nearly negligible. On the client
side, only extra 0.014s runtime is required for random num-
ber generation in InvisibleMe-Advanced . On the cloud side,
the time needed to match a pair of portrait graph is only
about 0.04s in InvisibleMe-Basic and decreases to 0.01s in
InvisibleMe-Advanced due to the hashed feature vector. The
cloud also needs 0.9s to generate system parameters for ran-
dom number generation. The millisecond-level portrait graph
transmission delay is negligible too. So the total computation
delays for both variants are about 3s on the client and 1s on
the cloud, which results a 4s system computation delay.
Now we’ve learned the magnitude of the time cost for each
component, the overall delay also depends on the number of
co-located invisible neighbors. With more active peers sending
privacy requests, the matching cost will increase, but compared
to the image processing cost, the matching cost on the cloud
side is still quite small. Besides, the power consumption
caused by our protocol (second-level computation) is much
smaller than that caused by photo capturing itself.
E. Case Evaluation
We conduct the case based evaluation as described in
Section VI-B. When there are invisible users in the photo,
the false negative rate was about 1.4% and the false positive
rate was 0.9%. But when there are no invisible users in the
photo, the false positive rate raises to 4.9% due to the absent
of any true match users, and the threshold 0.5 was not high
enough to exclude all false match. And the average time for
successful invisible people removal is about 4 seconds.
F. Compare with Alternative Solution
For comparison purpose, we also realize private Euclidean
distance computation using a partial homomorphic encryption
(Paillier encryption) in the SMC manner (e.g. the method used
in [5]). Using the same computer and test images, the Paillier-
based method takes about 0.5s for feature vector encryption
and 1.8s for portrait matching between a pair of feature
vectors. But with our approach, the transformation cost is
negligible and the matching cost is only 0.01s. Besides, our
method requires no interaction during the matching process.
The comparison shows the a significant efficiency of our
system.
VII. RELATED WORK
Visual Privacy Protection There is a trivial solution to protect
image content. Blacking out private contents, e.g. human
faces, thwarts any possible violation of owners’ privacy. For
example, systems like Blinkering Surveillance [22] and [23]
use computer vision methods to hide sensitive contents from
video frame. But in a photographing scenario, the challenge
is how to match people’s privacy requests with people in
the photo. Face recognition is a alternative way to solve the
matching problem, e.g. Eigenfaces [4]. To use face recognition
approaches, it requires the people to face to cameras. Besides,
during the information exchange process, face descriptors
could be leaked to adversaries. There are some work providing
privacy-preserving face recognition leverages homomorphic
encryption, by which a client can privately search for a specific
face image in the face image database of a server, e.g., [6].
Those methods provide privacy protection to the requested
images as well as the outcome of the matching algorithm,
but the computation overhead is large and the result is not
secure against the service provider.
Graph matching. Graph matching methods have been ap-
plied in many tasks such as face recognition [15], fingerprint
identification [16] and others [17]. Their application-oriented
specifications, e.g., assumptions about node numbers, graph
structure and pre-knowledge of correspondences, make them
difficult to be applied in this work.
Privacy-Preserving Distance Computation. Euclidean dis-
tance can be computed privately among parties using secure
multi-party computation (SMC) methods [5], [6] or garble
circuit [6]. However, they usually require online interactions
among data owners. Moreover, their large computation cost
and ciphertext size make them unsuitable for mobile ap-
plications. [24] proposes an approach using Fourier-related
transforms to hide accurate data values and to approximately
preserve Euclidean distances among them. It works well for
some data mining purpose on large datasets, but the trans-
formation is public and deterministic and it cannot prevent
malicious user from dictionary attack.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we present a new approach InvisibleMe to
protect users’ portrait privacy during photo taking and sharing.
With our system, users that are unwilling to be photographed
will be automatically erased from the pictures in a lightweight
and privacy-preserving way. To achieve this goal, we propose
the integrated system model, a graph matching scheme to
locate people in pictures and a privacy-preserving vector
distance computation method. We have fully implemented our
protocol, and thoroughly evaluated our design.
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